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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to estimate an econometric model for analyzing the 
interrelationship among democracy, corruption and economic growth in 12 MENA countries by using 
simultaneous-equation models over the period 1998–2011. Our empirical results show that there is bi-
directional causal relationship between democracy and economic growth, as well as corruption and 
economic growth, and there is unidirectional causal relationship running from democracy to 
corruption for the region as a whole. 
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1. Introduction 
The main potential role of government is to guarantee its citizens the enjoyment of 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. Democracy goes hand in hand 
with an effective, honest, transparent and freely chosen government. 
For some countries; wealth, democracy and low or moderate levels of corruption 
are mutually reinforced, while for others, it is noted that; poverty, undemocratic 
political institutions and high levels of corruption constitute a vicious circle. 
Therefore, we can say that economic growth, corruption and democratization are 
closely related. 
In the third world countries, abuse of political and administrative power at the 
expense of citizens remains a problem. The abuse of public office takes many 
forms. In particular, the receipt of direct payments for political favors by adopting 
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laws for the manipulation of elections, the expenditure of public money for private 
purposes for groups of friends and voters. 
At the international level, corruption is considered a major problem that must be 
addressed urgently, especially in developing countries. It tends to impede 
investment and economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Sekkat Méon, 2005), 
exacerbates the problems of underground economies (Friedman et al. 2000; Dreher 
et al. 2009; Bjørnskov, 2011;), exacerbate the difference between the rich and the 
poor (Gupta et al. 2002; Uslaner, 2008), create barriers to economic and political 
reforms (Hellman et al. 2003; Shleifer, 1997), and may, in the long run, lead to 
substantial losses for human well-being (Kaufmann et al. 2005). 
The theoretical literature in political sciences and economics has made numerous 
efforts in this context and stressed the importance of the political institutions in 
shaping the patterns of the government corruption. However, the corresponding 
empirical literature is relatively rare. Democracy can be defined as an institutional 
mechanism where citizens express their preferences through elections 
(Schumpeter, 1950). In general, the theory predicts that democracy reduces 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999) protects civil liberties and sets up an 
independent judiciary system that can reduce Corruption (Schwartz, 1999; 
Treisman, 2000; Moran, 2001; Adserà et al. 2003; Saha et al. 2009; Go Kotera et 
al. 2012). Thanks to democracy, multiple monitoring instruments, such as free and 
independent media, free and proper elections will work well, so that the brake and 
counterweight against corruption by politicians and bureaucrats improve. 
In a tradition dating back to the modernization of literature, researchers have 
suggested that the social, economic and cultural conditions make democratization 
likely to happen. Therefore, we had better check if economic development leads to 
democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Benhabib et al. 2011; Yi Che et al. 2013; 
Moral-Benito and Bartolucci, 2012; Benedikt Heid et al. 2012) or democracy 
generates and provides the best conditions to promote economic growth (Rodrik 
and Wazciarg, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 
2008). The theory of modernity stated by Lipset (1959) is still relevant in the recent 
studies, such as (Acemoglu et al. 2009, Glaeser et al. 2007; Freeman and Quin, 
2012). Leading journals legitimize our study which has not yet been conducted on 





2. Literature Review 
Several existing works on the nexus between democracy, corruption and economic 
growth carried out on a piecemeal basis without a comprehensive model in mind 
ignore the potential interaction between the series. Thus this paper reviews the 
literature under three subsections, i.e., (1) economic growth and democracy; (2) 
economic growth and corruption (3) democracy and corruption. We discuss them 
below. 
 
2.1. Economic Growth and Democracy  
The relationship between economic growth and democracy has been intensively 
analyzed empirically over the past two decades. 
A proposition of major and perennial interest to both economists and political 
scientists is if economic development promotes democracy. Many studies have 
reported a positive association between income per capita and the degree of 
democracy (see, for example, Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1997, 1999; Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, 2008). However, establishing the causal impact of economic 
development on democracy is challenging, because there could be unobserved 
factors influencing both economic development and democracy (i.e., the omitted 
variables issue), and there may also be reverse causality running from democracy 
to economic development. We see many different studies in the literature which 
analyze the dimension of the relationship between economic growth and 
democracy. There are many scholars who admit Lipset’s assertions and many 
others who do not. Friedman, who claims that there is a reciprocal relationship 
between the two, sees democracy as a positive supporter of economic development 
where more democratic rules will bring more liberal economic rules, which 
contributes to more economic development. As long as scholars develop new 
statistical measurement techniques and more reliable data sets regarding 
democracy and economic growth, the results vary evenly. In this regard, I 
demonstrate the conflicts and findings in the literature. 
Several empirical studies tend to confirm the advantage of the authoritarian 
regimes in the process of economic development (Gerring et al. 2005; Booth, 2012; 
Kelsall and Booth, 2013). However, others suggest a beneficial effect of 
democracy on economic growth (Tavares and Wacziarg, 1997; Rodrik and 
Wacziarg, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2008; Fayad et al. 2012; Acemoglu et al. 
2014). On the others hand, others only able to include any influence of democracy 
on economic growth. This is proved, for example, through the work of Efendic et 
al. (2011) who have synthesized meta-analysis the results of previous tests that 
analyze the effect of democracy on economic growth and have concluded the 
absence of an agreed outcome. 
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The assumption of modernization theory says that economic development and 
education are indispensable conditions for democracy (Lipset, 1959, 1994). Wealth 
and education can influence the likelihood of democratization through many 
channels. Since the pioneering work of Lipset (1959), economic growth has 
stimulated the democratization of political regimes (Przeworski et al. 1997; Barro, 
1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006; Papaioannou et al. 2008; 
Acemoglu et al. 2008; Boix, 2011). 
The non-linearity in the relationship between economic growth and democracy 
(Acemoglu et al. (2008)) is evident against the hypothesis supported by (Gundlach 
and Paldam, 2009; Benhabib et al. 2011; Treisman, 2011). We argue that the effect 
of economic growth on democracy may be different for different levels of 
economic growth. This could be explained by the fact that the stability of 
institutions is strongly correlated with economic performance (eg, North, 1990; 
Cheng and Feng, 1996; Jong-A-Pin, 2009). Therefore, democracy in poor countries 
with weaker institutions will be affected by changes in economic development. For 
this reason, the relationship between economic growth and democracy in 
developing countries is nonlinear. However, in rich countries, where institutions 
are more stable, the evolution of the economic development has no effect on the 
level of democracy, which shows that this relationship is linear in the developed 
countries. 
We will therefore seek the prerequisites of democracy and analyze the role that 
economic development can have in the political structure. 
The question is whether the authoritarian political regimes if the countries in the 
MENA region have survived the waves through democratic growth and economic 
development. 
As already shown above, economic growth depends on democracy (Rodrik and 
Wazciarg, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). 
Thus, democracy depends on GDP (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Benhabib et al. 2011; 
Benedikt Heid et al. 2012; Moral-Benito and Bartolucci, 2012; Yi Che et al. 2013). 
Indeed, these variables are endogenous. We therefore believe that a model of 
simultaneous equations is more appropriate to address the problem of endogeneity. 
a.  Economic Growth and Corruption 
Not only corruption affects economic growth but also economic growth is likely to 
act on corruption. Economic development enables the authorities to have the 
necessary resources for the development of good institutions and the fight against 
corruption (Knack, 1999). The expected negative correlation between economic 
growth and corruption was documented by empirical research. Most studies that 




Usually, studies have found a strong negative correlation between economic 
growth and corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; La Porta et al. 1997, 1999; 
Treisman, 2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Persson et al. 2003; Serra, 2006). Only a 
few studies in the literature contradict these findings (Braun and Di Tella, 2004; 
Fréchette, 2004) arguing that economic growth increases corruption. Difficulty has 
been established within the meaning of causality between economic growth and 
corruption. In order to control potential endogeneity, Treisman (2000) argues that 
the levels of the perception of low corruption are high in economic development. A 
similar strong negative correlation between economic development and corruption 
is obtained by La Porta et al. (1999). 
Ades and Di Tella (1999) found that such a relationship is bidirectional, meaning 
that economic performance itself is affected by the quality of institutions. 
Similarly, Serra (2006) and Seldadyo and de Haan (2005, 2006) used reliable 
methods to control the sensitivity of the estimates of the regressions with 
alterations in the target information. They found a strong association between 
strong growth and low corruption.  
b.  Democracy and Corruption 
Across the world, the evidence shows that there is an inverse relationship between 
democracy and corruption. With democratic governments, countries lean towards 
low levels of corruption. The idea that democracy has a negative impact on 
corruption seems indisputable (Sung, 2004). 
However, the degree of influence of democratic reform at the level of corruption is 
not simple and uniform. The main reason for the disagreement between researchers 
lies in the characteristics of the multidimensional nature of “democracy” and 
“democratization” (Coppedge, 2002; Sung, 2004). 
Yet, empirical analyzes mainly support the negative association between 
democracy and corruption (Goldsmith, 1999; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; 
Treisman, 2000; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Bohara et al. 2004), 
but some of these analyzes are different. 
For example, studies have considered democracy as freedom of expression that 
feeds the investigative journalism and exposes and discourages corrupted public 
activities (Giglioli, 1996; Brunetti and Weder, 2003). Alternatively, other studies 
show that the relationship between democracy and corruption is nonlinear. Despite 
the increase if corruption in the intermediate democracies, consolidation of 
advanced democratic institutions can reduce corruption. On the other hand, the 
initial political conditions and final democratic achievements determine the extent 
of political corruption (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004). In addition, 
Treisman (2000) points out that long exposure to democracy reduces corruption. 
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However, Ades and Di Tella (1999) found that democracy has no significant effect 
on corruption, because countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, are 
experiencing very low levels of corruption, even if they do not have enough 
moderate political rights. 
 
2.2. Data and Model Specification 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the causality between democracy index, 
CPI, and economic growth using the production function whereby the GDP 
depends on endogenous variables including CPI and democracy index. This 
extended production function provides a meaningful framework to explore the 
three-way linkages between the three variables as additional factors of production.  
These simultaneous-equation models are also constructed on the basis of the 
theoretical and empirical insights from the existing literature. The causal links 
between democracy– corruption and economic growth, are estimated through 
physical capital (K), human capital (H), labor capital (L), energy consumption 
(ENERG), unemployment (UNEM), government size (SIZE), and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) which included as instrumental variables.  
GDP = f (CPI, DEM, H, K, L, UNEM, FDI)                                                        (1) 
This essentially states that economic growth is a function of index of perception of 
corruption (CPI), Democracy Index (DEM), human capital (H), capital stock (K), 
labor force (L), unemployment (UNEM), and foreign direct investment (FDI). We 
write Eq. (1) in a growth form with a time series specification, as follows: 
           =    +          +         +             +            +            
+              +             +                                                                       (2) 
Since our study is a panel data study, Eq. (2) can be written in panel data form as 
follows: 
             =    +             +           +               +              +   
           +                +              +                                                       (3)  
The three-way linkages between Institutional quality–democratization–growth are 
empirically examined by making use of the following three equations: 
             =    +            +            +                +               +    
           +                 +               +                                                    (4) 
     =    +                      +           +                    +                        (5) 
      =    +                      +            +                     +                   (6) 
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Where i represents the country (in our study, we have 12 countries
1
); t represents 
time (our time frame is 1998–2011). The annual data on gross domestic product 
(GDP) in constant US dollars are used as a proxy for economic growth (GDP). The 
corruption perception index (CPI) represents the index of perceived corruption 
published by Transparency International, and the index ranking countries on a scale 
from 10 to zero, according to the perceived level of corruption. A score of 10 
represents a reputedly total honest country, while a zero indicates that the country 
is perceived as completely corrupt. The democracy index (DEM) which was built 
by Freedom House, taker the average of the political rights and civil liberties. This 
variable is rescaled so that the value is stored from 1 (most democratic) and 7 (less 
democratic). The human capital (H) is measured by gross enrolment in secondary 
school, the physical capital stock (K) as a proxy gross capital formation (% of 
GDP) because it took into account the inventory change, and labor capital (L) 
measured by the rate of participation in the total active population (% of total 
population aged 15 and over). totals Unemployment in (% of population), energy 
use in kg of oil equivalent are used as a proxy for natural resources (ENERG), size 
of government measured by final consumption expenditure of general government 
(% of GDP) ,and (FDI) is the foreign direct investment (%GDP).                        
Eqs. (4) to (6) were estimated simultaneously by means of the generalized method 
of moments (GMM). The GMM is the estimation method the most commonly used 
in models with panel data and in the three-way linkages between some variables. 
This method uses a set of instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity problem. 
It is well-known that the GMM method provides consistent and efficient estimates 
in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Moreover, most of the diagnostic 
tests discussed in this study can be cast in a GMM framework. Sargan test was 
used to test the overidentifying restrictions in order to provide some evidence of 
the instruments' validity. The instrument validity is tested using Sargan test which 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions. In other words, the 
null hypothesis of the instruments appropriateness cannot be rejected. The Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test was used to test endogeneity. The null hypothesis was rejected, 
suggesting that the ordinary least squares estimates might be biased and 
inconsistent and hence the OLS was not an appropriate estimation technique. The 
GMM estimation with panel data proves to be advantageous to the OLS approach 
in a number of ways. 
2.3. Analysis and Results 
Our simultaneous equations are estimated by making use of two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), three stage least squares (3SLS) and the generalized method of moments 
(GMM). In what follows, we report the results of only GMM estimation. While the 
parameter estimates remained similar in magnitude and sign, the GMM estimation 
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 Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman  
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results were generally found to be statistically more robust. We estimated the three-
way linkage between democracy, corruption and economic growth; while the other 
variables were used as instruments. To do this, we used panel data from 12 MENA 
countries during 1998–2011. The correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables is presented in Table 2. Its coefficients suggest that the 
reported regression models will not be seriously distorted by multicollinearity. The 
real GDP correlates positively with the democracy, physical capital, human capital 
and labor capital, but correlates negatively with the index of corruption perception, 
unemployment and the stock of foreign investment. Then, CPI positively correlates 
with the size of government, and negatively with the index of democracy. Finally, 
democracy correlates positively with the energy production.  
Table 1. Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Ln(GDP) 1          
2 CPI -0.575 1         
3 DEM 0.389 -0.263 1        
4 Ln(H) 0.034 0.239 0.278 1       
5 Ln(K) 0.005 -0.335 -0.003 -0.268 1      
6 Ln(L) 0.226 0.276 -0.437 0.033 -0.411 1     
7 Ln(ENERG) 0.800 -0.301 0.457 0.436 -0.222 0.284 1    
8 Ln(UNEM) -0.287 -0.184 0.327 -0.385 0.414 -0.824 -0.386 1   
9 Ln(FDI) -0.352 0.108 -0.018 0.172 0.090 -0.367 -0.410 0.182 1  
10 Ln(SIZE) -0.553 0.634 -0.403 -0.043 0.233 0.138 -0.558 -0.057 0.128 1 
The empirical results about Eq. (4) are presented in Table 2, which shows that the 
effect of the index of corruption perception and that index of democracy on 
economic growth in the MENA countries is positive and statistically significant. 
GMM estimation of simultaneous equations. 
Table 2. Results for the equation 4 
 Eq.(4) 
 Dependent variable 









Sargan test (p value) 0.000 
DWH test (p value) 0.000  
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Notes: Values in parenthesis are the estimated p-values. Sargan-test refers to the over-identification test for the 
restrictions in GMM estimation. DWH test—Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity test. 
*Indicate significance at 1% level. 
** Indicate significance at 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at 10% level. 
Table 3. Results for the equation 5 
 Eq.(5) 






Sargan test (p value) 0.000 
DWH test (p value) 0.003 
Notes: Values in parenthesis are the estimated p-values. Sargan-test refers to the over-identification test for the 
restrictions in GMM estimation. DWH test—Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity test. 
*Indicate significance at 1% level. 
** Indicate significance at 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at 10% level. 
Table 4. Results for the equation 6 
 Eq.(6) 






Sargan test (p value) 0.000 
DWH test (p value) 0.000 
Notes: Values in parenthesis are the estimated p-values. Sargan-test refers to the over-identification test for the 
restrictions in GMM estimation. DWH test—Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity test. 
*Indicate significance at 1% level. 
** Indicate significance at 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at 10% level. 
Eq. (4) shows that the impact of corruption on economic growth is negative and 
significant at a rate of 5%. The coefficient is -0368, which indicates that when 
corruption increases by 1%, economic growth declines by about 37%. This result 
reinforces the idea of Blackburn et al. (2008), Dzhumashev (2009), and 
Avnimelech Zelekha (2011), and also Fiorino et al. (2012) that corruption leads to 
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an increase in inflation, which in turn reduces capital accumulation and economic 
growth. 
To find an explanation of the differences between the countries of the world, we 
will try to find institutional justifications for economic growth. Some institutional 
and policy variables were previously used as, for example, respect for property 
rights in Clague, Keefer and Olson (1996), Democracy in Barro (1996) and 
political instability in Alesina and Perotti (1994). For this reason, we choose the 
index of democracy as an institutional variable that determines economic growth. It 
must first be noted that the DEM proxy used in our model as the measure of 
democracy is inversely related to the latter, that is to say an increase in DEM 
indicates an increase in the autocracy and the country is becoming less free. 
The DEM variable is positively and significantly related to the variable real GDP at 
a rate of 1%, that is to say, the more we approach the authoritarian regime, the 
more economic growth improves. Then, we can say that a relatively low level of 
democracy in the countries of the MENA region is a determinant of a better 
economic performance. This is affirmed by Karl Schweinitz (1959) which provides 
that the least developed countries “must grow economically and limit participation 
in political affairs”. 
In fact, maintaining a more or less authoritarian practice is considered essential for 
the preservation of strong economic growth for the country to benefit from greater 
prosperity and greater stability. This result corroborates those of Haan and 
Siermann (1995), Bhagwati (2002), Drury et al. (2006), Kelsall and Booth (2013) 
and Booth (2012) which provide that non-democratic countries can achieve 
economic growth.  
This is also consistent with the work of Barro (1996) who found that democracy 
has a negative effect on economic growth after considering the empirical link for 
100 countries over a period which runs between 1960 and 1990. Actually, he 
demonstrated that “too little” and “too much” democracy disadvantage economic 
growth through reducing the rate of accumulation of physical capital and increased 
public spending. Peev and Mueller (2012) show that democracy can have a 
negative effect on economic growth by increasing the size of the public sector and 
the public deficit may lead to higher taxes. The study notes that the former 
communist countries that were in transition to democracy have experienced higher 
levels of growth. Their results also suggest that democracy brings with it certain 
institutional changes that hinder economic growth. Democracy is also unable to 
implement measures to increase investment, because it forces people to reduce 
their consumption levels. However, authoritarian regimes are able to take such 
measures (Rao, 1985). Moreover, proponents of this view argue that democracies 
are often unable to limit public social spending to stimulate growth distribution 
dealing with pressures (Haggard, 1990). 
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Furthermore, Przeworskiand and Limongi (1993) find that democracy undermines 
property rights of security by allowing some groups that have political power to 
make wealth of property owners. Therefore, this process leads to economic 
uncertainty and reduces economic growth. Therefore, it may be that the form of 
government adopted by the countries of the MENA region has been particularly 
favorable to economic growth. This cuts the overall impression of a strong 
confidence in the democratic institutions of these countries, and a search for 
stability and economic development through authoritarian regimes. 
Based on the increased Solow model, the variable of physical capital (K) is 
positively related to economic growth. The same is valid for Chen and Fleisher 
(1996), Gundlach (1997), Li et al. (1998) and Li and Choi (2000) Henderson et al. 
(2007). This makes us say that physical capital is found to have a leading role in 
economic growth in the MENA region, and the physical capital investments help 
build infrastructure capable of stimulating economic growth. 
Thus, working capital (L) has a positive impact on economic growth in the MENA 
region in the sense that it is in this cycle as the development of skills feels about 
economic growth. In addition, the results are consistent with the theory of 
economic growth, and show that the labor capital and physical capital are two 
crucial factors in economic growth. 
The variable “human capital” coefficient is negative and significant at 5% 
indicating that this variable is not able to explain the evolution of the economies of 
the MENA region, since labor productivity in these countries is weak. The negative 
impact exerted by the gross secondary enrollment growth of most economies in the 
MENA region should encourage governments in the region to spend an important 
part of public spending on education. For Aghion and Cohen (2004), developing 
countries need to invest more in primary and secondary education. 
Finally, the unemployment variable (ln UNEM) is negatively and significantly 
correlated with economic growth. In other words, two variables vary in opposite 
directions to each other when unemployment rate increases by 1%, economic 
growth falls by 87%. In fact, when unemployment is high and persistent, there are 
economic costs that can become detrimental to long-term growth. Unemployment 
is not only a high social cost for the individual but also a high economic cost for 
the society (Sanchis-i-Marco, 2011) .This result is consistent with that of Herwartz 
and Niebuhr (2011), and Mauro Carmeci (2003); Okun (1962) which state that 
deep economic reforms are needed to create jobs and spur economic growth. 
According to Eq. (5) economic growth is negatively and significantly related to 
corruption at a rate of 1%. This empirical result can be an explanation for 
economic growth that may be the favored vector of developments towards the 
establishment of democratic regimes and reduction of corruption in the MENA 
countries (Knack, 1999; Serra, 2006; de Haan and Seldadyo, 2006). 
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The coefficient of the index of democratic accountability is not statistically 
significant. This is explained by the fact that developing countries are characterized 
by less democratic political institutions and sometimes undemocratic which, do not 
influence corruption. This means that in these countries, less democratic political 
institutions, high levels of corruption and low levels of life together form a vicious 
circle. Therefore, among the reasons for the high level of corruption that eventually 
cause the poor economic performance of the developing countries, is the presence 
of less democratic or sometimes undemocratic political institutions in developing 
countries (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). 
The relationship between the government variable size and the perception index of 
corruption is positive and significant at 1%. However, this variable is approximated 
to the final consumption of public administrations of countries in the MENA region 
where the government is deemed by low wages for public officials, which leads to 
corruption. Poorly paid officials manage demand programs, budgets, taxes, 
customs regulations ... and there is an almost irresistible temptation to impose 
bribes (Goel and Nelson, 1998; Ali and Isse 2003; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; 
Zhou and Tao, 2009). 
Eq. (6) shows that the ratio of real GDP is significantly negative as expected based 
on the theory of modern Lipset (1959). The negative sign shows that with 
increasing economic growth, DEM variable, which is inversely related to 
democracy, decreases. This empirical result shows that the economic performance 
of countries in the MENA region led to a strengthening of democracy and that it is 
only possible after prior stage of development as often asserted by authoritarian 
states. In fact, the statement by Moore (1966), which says “no bourgeoisie- no 
democracy” again confirms what we have shown empirically. 
A general increase in economic growth has made improvements in institutions. 
Stability and institutional quality are highly correlated with economic performance 
(eg, North, 1990; Cheng and Feng, 1996; Jong-A-Pin, 2009). Therefore, democracy 
in poor countries with weakest institutions will be affected by changes in economic 
growth. However, in rich and developed countries, institutions are more stable and 
thus the evolution of economic growth has no effect on the level of democracy. 
Over 70% of all democratic relapses occur during economic stagnation. In fact, 
economic downturns also present dangers for democracies. Therefore, signs of 
economic stress because of their potential impact on Africa's ability to maintain a 
positive democratic impulse. 
The strong conclusion, which is politically important in our results, is that 
developing countries are likely to transform their political systems to democracy by 
increasing real GDP. Actually, this does not mean that all countries become 
democratic once they have reached a certain level of development, but a political 
change towards democracy as countries become richer and the improvement of 
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living standards, measured by real GDP, increases the chance of a country to adopt 
a democratic system. The empirical results show that economic growth is one of 
the essential pillars of democracy. It would become possible and also essential 
beyond a certain level of economic development. These results also confirm the 
modernization theory which shows that higher levels of prosperity will predict 
when and to what extent countries are ready to leave authoritarianism and become 
stable democracies. 
The variable measuring the production of energy, which is the variable that 
measures approximately natural resources, is positively correlated with the index of 
democracy. 
It has  already been known that the countries of the MENA region are rich in 
natural resources, and are assisted to the accompaniment of political violence and 
the income from this wealth has been used by public policymakers to block the 
establishment of democracy (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). In other words, the 
exploitation of natural resources leads to annuity catches by policy makers who 
establish institutions interested in ensuring the expropriation of these annuities for 
their own profits at the expense of the whole society and perverse political 
incentives. Thus, the rich natural resources exacerbate competition for takeover, 
synonymous with the control of these resources. This confirms, for example the 
results of Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) Bulte et al. (2005) Brunnschweiler 












Figure 1. Interrelationship among GDP, CPI and DEM for MENA countries 
Therefore, according to the overall results, we can conclude that: (1) there is a two-
way causal relationship between economic growth and democracy; (2) there is 
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corruption; and (3) there is unidirectional causal relationship between democracy 
and the index of corruption perception for the region as a whole. Fig. 1 summarizes 
the GMM panel data results of Table2, 3 and 4. These results support a three-way 
link between economic growth, corruption and democracy over the period of 1998 
-2011 study. 
 
3. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
While the literature on the causality links between democracy, corruption and 
economic growth for individual countries and for panels of countries has increased 
over the last few years, there is no study that examines this interrelationship using a 
growth framework and simultaneous equation models. The objective of the present 
work is to fill this research gap by examining the above interaction for 12 MENA 
countries over the period 1998–2011. 
Our analysis suggests that (i) there is bi-directional causal relationship between 
economic growth and democracy; (ii) there is bi-directional causal relationship 
between economic growth and the index of perception of corruption; and (iii) there 
is a uni-directional causal relationship from democracy to index of perception of 
corruption.  
The main new policy implications of our study are as follows. 
Regarding the impact of economic growth on corruption, we found that this 
relationship is negative and significant for the MENA countries through this; we 
can say that economic growth may be the favored vector of development towards 
the establishment of democratic regimes and the reduction of corruption in the 
MENA countries. 
The high level of corruption subsequently causing poor economic performance of 
developing countries is due to the presence of non-democratic institutions. This 
notifies that in these countries, non-democratic political institutions, high levels of 
corruption, public expenditure, which are subject to rent-seeking and low living 
standards, evolve in parallel. It is therefore necessary to implement the reforms that 
stimulate policy development and the need to reflect on progress, challenges and 
prospects of the project of democracy and good governance for the countries of the 
MENA region. 
Ultimately, we can confirm that our analysis helps to encourage the governments 
of the MENA region to implement programs for economic growth similar to the 
Chinese one to increase the chances of transforming authoritarian regimes in to 
democratic systems. Through this change, they will fight corruption that hinders 
the proper functioning of institutions, the efficiency of public spending, so that the 
resources that come from the government serve the purpose for which they were 
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intended and should achieve high rates of economic growth and stop to think that 
the lack of democracy is an obstacle to their own development. 
We believe that future research should explore issues of civil conflict, religion and 
economic crises that may also play a key role in the democratization of countries. 
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